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Sermon 70: The Case of Reason Impartially Considered

https://wesleyworks.ecdsdev.org/sermons/Sermon070

02:567 An Introductory Comment [to Sermons 69-70]

These next two sermons were paired in this order in SOSO, VI (1788), even though they had been written earlier and in reverse sequence. ‘The Case of Reason…’ dates from July 6, 1781, and from Langham Row in Lincolnshire (cf. the Journal entry for that day for Wesley’s critical remarks on the then famous historian, William Robertson). He then had the sermon published as No. VI in the Arminian Magazine for November and December of that year (IV.574-80, 630-36) without a title. Wesley had preached from its text, 1 Cor. 14:20, only twice before (January 8, 1753, and March 20, 1772). ‘Imperfection…’ had been written in early March 1784 in Bristol and then promptly printed in the Arminian Magazine as No. XXI in June and July (VII.233-41, 290-98), also without a title and with an error in citation of the text (‘…we know in part’ is cited as 1 Cor. 13:10 instead of 13:9, and this error is faithfully repeated twice by Paramore in SOSO, VI.53-54). That this was a problem still much on Wesley’s mind is suggested by the fact that he had preached on 1 Cor. 13:9 four times in 1783.

Wesley brought both sermons together in SOSO, VI, and quite logically, since both are comments on the actual limitations of ‘human understanding’ and on the practical implications for Christian living of an intellectual modesty deeply grounded in a religious understanding of transcendence. Wesley had grown up in the fading days of an Anglican rationalism (Ray, Butler, Clarke, Paley) which took for granted that a sincere ‘faith seeking understanding’ would surely be richly rewarded, since faith and reason are finally consonant. And, as we have seen, he was himself a rationalist of sorts. But as deism and ‘the Enlightenment’ had progressed and, even more particularly, as a certain confidence in human rationality had filtered down to ordinary folk, Wesley recognized a growing threat both to Christian faith and to any proper sense of Christian reverence and awe.

02:568These two sermons are therefore intended as antidotes and alternatives to what Wesley regarded as a false rationalism. Even so, and not accidentally, Wesley also reflects here his undiminished interest in a valid ‘theology of culture.’ It is worth noting and comparing the higher than average number of his passing allusions here to ‘contemporary’ science, philosophy, and literature. If this is ‘plain truth for plain people’, the Methodists were no longer as ‘plain’ as they had been in their earlier, humbler beginnings.

02:587 The Case of Reason Impartially Considered

1 Corinthians 14:20

Brethren, be not children in understanding: in wickedness be ye children; but in understanding be ye men.

This translation of κακία as ‘wickedness’ seems peculiar to Wesley; cf. his Notes for still further revisions of the AV. Wycliffe, Tyndale, Cranmer, Geneva, Rheims, and AV all render it as ‘malice’ or ‘maliciousness’.

11. It is the true remark of an eminent man, who had made many observations on human nature, ‘If reason be against a man, a man will always be against reason.’

Thomas Hobbes; cf. The Last Saying, or Dying Legacy of Mr. Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Who Departed This Life on Thursday, December 4, 1679. Printed for the Author’s Executors (1680), p.39: ‘In matters of right or interest, where reason is against a man, a man will be against reason.’ See also Jonathan Swift, A Letter to a Young Clergyman, §3. See also, below, II.4.

This has been confirmed by the experience of all ages. Very many have been the instances of it in the Christian as well as the heathen world; yea, and that in the earliest times. Even then there were not wanting well-meaning men who, not having much reason themselves, imagined that reason was of no use in religion; yea, rather, that it was a hindrance to it. And there has not been wanting a succession of men who have believed and asserted the same thing. But never was there a greater number of these in the Christian church, at least in Britain, than at this day.

22. Among them that despise and vilify reason you may always expect to find those enthusiasts who suppose the dreams of their own imagination to be revelations from God. We cannot expect that men of this turn will pay much regard to reason. Having an infallible guide, they are very little moved by the reasonings of fallible men. In the foremost of these we commonly find the whole herd of antinomians; all that, however they may differ in other respects, agree in ‘making void the law through faith’.

Cf. Rom. 3:31.

If you oppose reason to these, when they are asserting propositions ever so full of absurdity and blasphemy, they will probably think it 02:588a sufficient answer to say, ‘Oh, this is your reason!’ Or, your carnal reason. So that all arguments are lost upon them: they regard them no more than stubble or rotten wood.

33. How natural is it for those who observe this extreme to run into the contrary! While they are strongly impressed with the absurdity of undervaluing reason, how apt are they to overvalue it! So much easier it is to run from east to west than to stop at the middle point! Accordingly we are surrounded with those—we find them on every side—who lay it down as an undoubted principle that reason is the highest gift of God. They paint it in the fairest colours: they extol it to the skies. They are fond of expatiating in its praise: they make it little less than divine. They are wont to describe it as very near, if not quite infallible. They look upon it as the all-sufficient director of all the children of men, able by its native light to guide them into all truth, and lead them into all virtue.

Cf. Irène Simon, Three Restoration Divines, I.ii, espec. the references to Lord Falkland of Great Tew, Chillingworth, Stillingfleet, et al. But see also Joseph Butler, Analogy of Religion, passim.

44. They that are prejudiced against the Christian revelation, who do not receive the Scriptures as the oracles of God, almost universally run into this extreme. I have scarce known any exception: so do all, by whatever name they are called, who deny the Godhead of Christ. (Indeed some of these say, they do not deny his Godhead, but only his supreme Godhead. Nay, this is the same thing; for in denying him to be the supreme God they deny him to be any God at all—unless they will assert that there are two gods, a great one and little one!) All these are vehement applauders of reason as the great unerring guide. To these overvaluers of reason we may generally add men of eminently strong understanding; who, because they do know more than most other men, suppose they can know all things. But we may likewise add many who are in the other extreme, men of eminently weak understanding; men in whom pride (a very common case) supplies the void of sense; who do not suspect themselves to be blind, because they were always so.

The prime example here would be, of course, David Hume; cf. also Nos. 120, ‘The Unity of the Divine Being’, §§19, 20; 128, ‘The Deceitfulness of the Human Heart’, §3, II.7; and ‘Remarks on Count de Buffon’s Natural History’ (AM, 1782, V.546-48).

55. Is there then no medium between these extremes,

Cf. No. 27, ‘Sermon on the Mount, VII’, §4 and n.

undervaluing and overvaluing reason? Certainly there is. But who 02:589is there to point it out? To mark down the middle way? That great master of reason, Mr. Locke, has done something of the kind, something applicable to it, in one chapter of his Essay concerning Human Understanding.

Wesley had read Locke’s Essay (1690) in Oxford in 1725, and he had published a digest of it, with critical comments, in AM (1782-84), V-VII. Locke’s empiricism was never more than partially satisfying to Wesley, as in the sections ‘Of Reason’ (IV.xvii) and ‘Of Faith and Reason and Their Distinct Provinces’ (IV.xviii). See also The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), which still fell short of Wesley’s concern for intuition in matters of ‘our knowledge of God and of the things of God.’

But it is only remotely applicable to this: he does not come home to the point. The good and great Dr. Watts has wrote admirably well both concerning reason and faith.

Wesley had read Watts, The Strength and Weakness of Human Reason, in the year of its publication (1731), and in 1734 he records having read the better known Logic, or, the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry After Truth (1725). Watts had died (1748) before Wesley got round to The Improvement of the Mind (1741). It would take a sharp-eyed critic to detect as much of a difference between Watts and Wesley as Wesley here implies, save for the latter’s greater stress on faith as noetic.

But neither does anything he has written point out the medium between valuing it too little and too much.

6. I would gladly endeavour in some degree to supply this grand defect: to point out, first, to undervaluers of it, what reason can do; and then to the overvaluers of it, what reason cannot do.

But before either the one or the other can be done it is absolutely necessary to define the term, to fix the precise meaning of the word in question. Unless this is done men may dispute to the end of the world without coming to any good conclusion. This is one great cause of the numberless altercations which have been on the subject. Very few of the disputants thought of this—of defining the word they were disputing about.

But see Locke’s ‘Epistle to the Reader’ in his Essay, and his comments in I.i.7-8; see also his ‘Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester’, in Works (London, 1823, Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963), I.7ff.

The natural consequence was, they were just as far from an agreement at the end as at the beginning.

1I. 1. First, then, reason is sometimes taken for argument. So. ‘Give me a reason for your assertion.’ So in Isaiah, ‘Bring forth your strong reasons;’

Isa. 41:21.

that is, your strong arguments. We use the word in nearly the same sense when we say, ‘He has good reasons for what he does.’ It seems here to mean: he has sufficient motives, such as ought to influence a wise man. But how is the word to be understood in the celebrated question concerning ‘the reasons of 02:590things’?

Cf. Eccles. 7:25.

Particularly when it is asked, An rationes rerum sint aeternae?

A perennial question in Western philosophical theology. Cf. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII (q. LXVI, ‘De ideis’), in Migne, PL, XL.29-31, where he speaks of rationes aeternae as subsisting in God. On the medieval influence of this text (and its thesis), see Martin Grabmann, ‘Des H. Augustinus Quaestio “de ideis”…in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelalterlichen Weiterwirkung’, in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (München, Max Huber Verlag, 1936), II.25-34. Thomas treats the question in his Super Sent. I.36; in Summa Contra Gentiles, I.54; Summa Theologica, I, Qq. 55, 56, 93; in De Veritate, Q. 3; and in Quodlibeta, IV, Q. 1. Cf. An Earnest Appeal, §§28-32 (11:55-56 in this edn.).

—whether the reasons of things are eternal. Do not the ‘reasons of things’ here mean the relations of things to each other? But what are the eternal relations of temporal things? Of things which did not exist till yesterday? Could the relations of these things exist before the things themselves had any existence? Is not then the talking of such relations a flat contradiction? Yea, as palpable a one as can be put into words.

22. In another acceptation of the word, reason is much the same with understanding. It means a faculty of the human soul; that faculty which exerts itself in three ways: by simple apprehension, by judgment, and by discourse. Simple apprehension is barely conceiving a thing in the mind, the first and most simple act of understanding. Judgment is the determining that the things before conceived either agree with or differ from each other. Discourse (strictly speaking) is the motion of progress of the mind from one judgment to another. The faculty of the soul which includes these three operations I here mean by the term reason.

33. Taking the word in this sense, let us now impartially consider, first, what it is that reason can do. And who can deny that it can do much, very much, in the affairs of common life? To begin at the lowest point, it can direct servants how to perform the various works wherein they are employed; to discharge their duty either in the meanest offices or in any of a higher nature. It can direct the husbandman at what time and in what manner to cultivate his ground: to plough, to sow, to reap, to bring in his corn, to breed and manage his cattle, and to act with prudence and propriety in every part of his employment. It can direct artificers how to prepare the various sorts of apparel, and the thousand necessaries and conveniences of life, not only for themselves and their households, but for their neighbours, whether nigh or afar off. It can direct those of higher abilities to plan and execute works of a more elegant kind. It can direct the 02:591painter, the statuary, the musician, to excel in the stations wherein providence has placed them. It can direct the mariner to steer his course over the bosom of the great deep. It enables those who study the laws of their country to defend the property or life of their fellow-subjects; and those who study the art of healing to cure most of the maladies to which we are exposed in our present state.

An echo of a familiar Puritan theme already reiterated, e.g., in the anonymous pamphlet of 1687, entitled, An Occasional Discourse Concerning God’s Fore-Knowledge and Man’s Free-Agency: Being an Attempt to reconcile their seeming Opposition and to assert the Truth of both from the Holy Scriptures: ‘…we see plainly that, by the good providence and disposal of Almighty God, men have power to do many things, as namely, to cultivate the earth, to build houses, to provide against hunger and cold, to educate their children, to exercise [their] several arts and trades, for the benefit of human life, and to manage all these according to certain rules, methods, and observations, arising partly from experience, and partly from men’s consulting one another. In short, I conceive that God, having indued man with an understanding to judge, and a will to choose, and continually supplying him with power to act according to his nature, he doth not ordinarily overpower or impel his faculties, but leaves them to the free use and exercise thereof in things within his proper sphere. And this [power to judge and to choose] is what I mean by free will. Now, I address to my [second] province, which is to assert this, together with God’s foreknowledge of future events from Scriptures’ (pp. 25-26).

44. To ascend higher still, it is certain reason can assist us in going through the whole circle of arts and sciences: of grammar, rhetoric, logic, natural and moral philosophy, mathematics, algebra, metaphysics. It can teach whatever the skill or industry of man has invented for some thousand years. It is absolutely necessary for the due discharge of the most important offices, such as are those of magistrates, whether of an inferior or superior rank; and those of subordinate or supreme governors, whether of states, provinces, or kingdoms.

55. All this few men in their senses will deny. No thinking man can doubt but reason is of considerable service in all things relating to the present world. But suppose we speak of higher things, the things of another world. What can reason do here? Is it a help or a hindrance of religion? It may do much in the affairs of men. But what can it do in the things of God?

66. This is a point that deserves to be deeply considered. If you ask, What can reason do in religion? I answer, It can do exceeding much, both with regard to the foundation of it, and the superstructure.

The foundation of true religion stands upon the oracles of God.

Cf. No. 5, ‘Justification by Faith’, §2 and n.

It is built upon the prophets and apostles, Jesus Christ 02:592himself being the chief corner-stone.

See Eph. 2:20.

Now of what excellent use is reason if we would either understand ourselves, or explain to others, those living oracles! And how is it possible without it to understand the essential truths contained therein? A beautiful summary of which we have in that which is called the Apostles’ Creed. Is it not reason (assisted by the Holy Ghost) which enables us to understand what the Holy Scriptures declare concerning the being and attributes of God? Concerning his eternity and immensity, his power, wisdom, and holiness? It is by reason that God enables us in some measure to comprehend his method of dealing with the children of men; the nature of his various dispensations, of the Old and New Covenant, of the law and the gospel. It is by this we understand (his Spirit opening and enlightening the eyes of our understanding)

See Eph. 1:18.

what that repentance is, not to be repented of;

See 2 Cor. 7:10.

what is that faith whereby we are saved; what is the nature and the condition of justification; what are the immediate and what the subsequent fruits of it. By reason we learn what is that new birth, without which we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven, and what that holiness is, without which no man shall see the Lord.

See Heb. 12:14.

By the due use of reason we come to know what are the tempers implied in inward holiness, and what it is to be outwardly holy, holy in all manner of conversation

1 Pet. 1:15.

—in other words, what is the mind that was in Christ,

See Phil. 2:5.

and what it is to walk as Christ walked.

See 1 John 2:6.

77. Many particular cases will occur, with respect to several of the foregoing articles, in which we shall have occasion for all our understanding if we would keep a conscience void of offence.

Acts 24:16.

Many cases of conscience are not to be solved without the utmost exercise of our reason. The same is requisite in order to understand and to discharge our ordinary relative duties; the duties of parents and children, of husband and wives, and (to name no more) of masters and servants. In all these respects, and in all the duties of common life, God has given us our reason for a guide. And it is only by acting up to the dictates of it, by using all the understanding which God hath given us, that we can have a conscience void of offence towards God and towards man.

Ibid.

802:5938. Here then there is a large field indeed wherein reason may expatiate and exercise all its powers. And if reason can do all this, both in civil and religious things, what is it that it cannot do?

We have hitherto endeavoured to lay aside all prejudice, and to weigh the matter calmly and impartially. The same course let us take still: let us now coolly consider, without prepossession on any side, what it is, according to the best light we have, that reason cannot do.

1II. 1. And, first, reason cannot produce faith. Although it is always consistent with reason, yet reason cannot produce faith in the scriptural sense of the word. Faith, according to Scripture, is ‘an evidence or conviction of things not seen’.

Cf. Heb. 11:1.

It is a divine evidence, bringing a full conviction of an invisible, eternal world.

Cf. No. 3, ‘Awake, Thou That Steepest’, I.11 and n.

It is true there was a kind of shadowy persuasion of this, even among the wiser heathens (probably from tradition, or from some gleams of light reflected from the Israelites). Hence many hundred years before our Lord was born, the Greek poet uttered that great truth,

Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth

Unseen, whether we wake, or if we sleep.

The couplet is misremembered from Milton, Paradise Lost, iv.677-78 (where 678 reads, ‘Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep’). The Greek poet is Hesiod, who in Works and Days, ll. 252-55, speaks of Zeus as having ‘thrice ten thousand spirits [who] keep watch on the judgments and deeds of wrong, as they roam, clothed in mist, all over the earth’. Cf. also Plato, Symposium, 202, D12 (203, A6): ‘through the demons there is intercourse between men and gods whether in the waking state or during sleep.’ Also, Juvenal speaks of spirits of another realm, and Wesley quotes this in No. 73, ‘Of Hell’, §3 and n.

Wesley repeats the Miltonic version (citing Hesiod) in Nos. 71, ‘Of Good Angels’, §3; 117, ‘On the Discoveries of Faith’, §6; 119, ‘Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith’, §5 (where, incidentally, Wesley quotes I.678 correctly). Cf. also An Earnest Appeal, §10 (11:48 in this edn.).

But this was little more than faint conjecture. It was far from a firm conviction; which reason in its highest state of improvement could never produce in any child of man.

22. Many years ago I found the truth of this by sad experience. After carefully heaping up the strongest arguments which I could find either in ancient or modern authors for the very being of a God and (which is nearly connected with it) the existence of an 02:594invisible world, I have wandered up and down, musing with myself: What if all these things which I see around me, this earth and heaven, this universal frame,

See Dryden, ‘A Song for St. Cecilia’s Day, 1687’, ll. 1-2:

From Harmony, from heav’nly Harmony

This universal Frame began.

has existed from eternity?

Cf. No. 15, The Great Assize, III.3 and n.

What if that melancholy supposition of the old poet be the real case.

“ Οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

Cf. Homer, Iliad, vi.146. But see also the continuing lines (147-49): ‘Even as are the generations of leaves, such are those also of men. As for the leaves, the wind scattereth some upon the earth, but the forest, as it burgeons, putteth forth others when the spring is come; even so of men one generation springeth up and another passeth away.’ See Ecclus. 14:17-18.

”

All flesh grows old, like a garment;

The age-old law is: All must die.

As with the leaves that grow on a vigorous tree:

One falls off and another sprouts—

So with the generations of flesh and blood:

One dies and another is born.

The metaphor is repeated in JWJ, July 10, 1779: ‘Taking a solitary walk in the churchyard, I felt the truth of “One generation goeth, and another cometh.” See how the earth drops its inhabitants as the tree drops its leaves!’ Cf. also, ibid., Oct. 13, 1786; and No. 29, ‘Sermon on the Mount, IX’, §28.

What if the generation of men be exactly parallel with the generation of leaves? If the earth drops its successive inhabitants just as the tree drops its leaves? What if that saying of a great man be really true,

Post mortem nihil est ipsaque mors nihil?

Cf. Seneca, Troades, II.ii.397; more exactly: ‘There is nothing after death, and even death itself is nothing.’ This passage had been repeated by John Hawkins in a sermon in a London church that Wesley knew well (St. James, Clerkenwell), The Certainty and Evidence of a Future State, being the Substance of Two Sermons Preached in the Parish Church of St. fames, Clerkenwell, Sunday, August 29, 1725, p. 7.

Death is nothing and nothing is after death?

How am I sure that this is not the case? That I have not followed cunningly devised fables? And I have pursued the thought till there was no spirit in me, and I was ready to choose strangling rather than life.

See Job 7:15.

33. But in a point of so unspeakable importance do not depend on the word of another; but retire for a while from the busy world, 02:595and make the experiment yourself. Try whether your reason will give you a clear, satisfactory evidence of the invisible world. After the prejudices of education are laid aside, produce your strong reasons for the existence of this. Set them all in array; silence all objections, and put all your doubts to flight. Alas, you cannot, with all your understanding. You may perhaps repress them for a season. But how quickly will they rally again, and attack you with redoubled violence! And what can poor reason do for your deliverance? The more vehemently you struggle, the more deeply you are entangled in the toils. And you find no way to escape.

44. How was the case with that great admirer of reason, the author of the maxim above cited? I mean the famous Mr. Hobbes. None will deny that he had a strong understanding. But did it produce in him a full and satisfactory conviction of an invisible world? Did it open the eyes of his understanding to see

“ Beyond the bounds of this diurnal sphere?

Milton, Paradise Lost, vii.21-22; see No. 54, ‘On Eternity’, §18 and n.

”

Oh no! Far from it! His dying words ought never to be forgotten. ‘Where are you going, sir?’ said one of his friends. He answered, ‘I am taking a leap in the dark,’ and died.

A legend that had already appeared in Samuel Wesley, Jun., Poems, p. 84, and earlier in a ‘broadside’ sheet dated 1680, entitled The Last Saying, or Dying Legacy of Mr. Thomas Hobbes (see also above, §1); and see John Watkins, Characteristic Anecdotes (1808), loc. cit.

Just such an evidence of the invisible world can bare reason give to the wisest of men!

55. Secondly, reason alone cannot produce hope in any child of man; I mean scriptural hope, whereby we ‘rejoice in hope of the glory of God’;

Rom. 5:2.

that hope which St. Paul in one place terms, ‘tasting of the powers of the world to come’;

Cf. Heb. 6:5.

in another, the ‘sitting in heavenly places with Christ Jesus’.

Cf. Eph. 2:6.

That which enables us to say, ‘Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath begotten us again unto a lively hope, …to an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, which is reserved in heaven for us.’

Cf. 1 Pet. 1:3-4.

This hope can only spring from Christian faith: therefore where there is not faith, there is not hope. Consequently reason, being unable to produce faith, must be equally unable to produce hope. Experience confirms this likewise. How often have I laboured, 02:596and that with my might, to beget this hope in myself? But it was lost labour. I could no more acquire this hope of heaven than I could touch heaven with my hand. And whoever of you makes the same attempt will find it attended with the same success. I do not deny that a self-deceiving enthusiast may work in himself a kind of hope. He may work himself up into a lively imagination, into a sort of pleasing dream. He may ‘compass himself about’, as the prophet speaks, ‘with sparks of his own kindling’. But this cannot be of long continuance; in a little while the bubble will surely break. And what will follow? ‘This shall ye have at my right hand,’ said the Lord, ‘ye shall lie down in sorrow.’

Cf. Isa. 50:11.

66. If reason could have produced a hope full of immortality in any child of man, it might have produced it in that great man whom Justin Martyr scruples not to call, ‘a Christian before Christ’.

Cf. The Second Apology, ch. 10; and see also Robert Barclay, Apology (1736), Prop. V-VI, ‘The Universal and Saving Light’, where a similar allusion is made to Socrates. For other references in the sermons to Socrates, cf. Nos. 54, ‘On Eternity’, §18; 71, ‘Of Good Angels’, §2; and 119, ‘Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith’, §10.

For who that was not favoured with the written Word of God ever excelled, yea, or equalled Socrates? In what other heathen can we find so strong an understanding, joined with so consummate virtue?

This allusion to Socrates’s ‘consummate virtue’ calls to mind Wesley’s sarcastic reference to Dr. John Taylor’s applying the same to Jesus, as in Nos. 105, ‘On Conscience’, I.10; and 123, ‘On Knowing Christ after the Flesh’, §4.

But had he really this hope? Let him answer for himself. What is the conclusion of that noble apology which he made before his unrighteous judges? ‘And now, O judges, ye are going hence to live; and I am going hence to die. Which of these is best the gods know; but I suppose no man does.’

Cf. Plato, Apology, 42: ‘I go to die and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot is known only to God.’ Note that Wesley has magnified the distance between Socrates and Christianity by rendering Plato’s singular τῷ θεῷ as ‘the gods’. See No. 119, ‘Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith’, §10.

No man knows! How far is this from the language of the little Benjamite?

St. Paul, whose pride of tribal membership is reflected in Phil. 3:5 and Rom. 11:1. In his Notes also (Acts 19:21), Wesley uses the phrase, ‘the little Benjamite’ to apply to St. Paul. But he himself was ‘little’, and he had been brought up with the tradition (now proved incorrect) that his own middle name was Benjamin.

‘I desire to depart and to be with Christ; for it is far better.’

Cf. Phil. 1:23.

And how many thousands are there at this day, even in our own nation, young men and maidens, old men and children, who are able to witness the same good confession!

702:5977. But who is able to do this by the force of his reason, be it ever so highly improved? One of the most sensible and most amiable heathens that have lived since our Lord died, even though he governed the greatest empire in the world, was the Emperor Adrian.

I.e., Publius Aelius Hadrianus, Emperor A.D. 117-38, in succession to Trajan.

It is his well-known saying, ‘A prince ought to resemble the sun: he ought to shine on every part of his dominion, and to diffuse his salutary rays in every place where he comes.’

Cf. Laurence Echard, Ecclesiastical History, III.i.304: ‘Staying at Rome a short time, he [the Emperor Hadrian] took a resolution to visit the whole empire in person, and see if all things were well regulated and established; and taking with him a splendid retinue and a considerable force, he first entered Gaul, where he made a lustration of the inhabitants, viewed the cities and forts, giving marks of his favour, as in all other places of the empire. In his travels he usually said that an emperor ought to imitate the sun, who carried his light through all the regions of the earth; and he generally travelled on foot always with head bare, making no difference between the frozen Alps and the scorching sands of Egypt.’

And his life was a comment upon his word: wherever he went he was executing justice and showing mercy. Was not he then, at the close of a long life, full of immortal hope? We are able to answer this from unquestionable authority, from his own dying words. How inimitably pathetic!

Adriani morientis ad animam suam

(Dying Adrian to his soul):

Animula, vagula, blandula,

Hospes, comesque corporis,

Quae nunc abibis in loca,

Pallidula, rigida, nudula,

Nec, ut soles, dabis jocos!

Cf. Minor Latin Poets, Loeb, 284, p. 444. Wesley’s text here is verbatim.

Which the English reader may see translated into our own language with all the spirit of the original:

Poor, little, pretty, fluttering thing,

Must we no longer live together.

And dost thou prune thy trembling wing,

To take thy flight thou know’st not whither?

Thy pleasing vein, thy humorous folly,

Lies all neglected, all forgot!

And pensive, wav’ring, melancholy,

Thou hop’st, and fear’st, thou know’st not what.

Cf. Prior, ‘Adriani morientis ad animam suam’ (cf. Aelius Spartianus, De Vita Hadriani, §xxv); here, Wesley’s memory is less accurate. He had already published Pope’s experiments with this passage in A Collection of Moral and Religious Poems (1744), II.184-85; see also Pope, Works (1964), VI.91-94. The passage is repeated with further alterations in No. 119, ‘Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith’, §10; cf. Also A Farther Appeal, Pt. II.III.19 (11:267 in this edn.).

802:5988. Thirdly, reason, however cultivated and improved, cannot produce the love of God; which is plain from hence: it cannot produce either faith or hope, from which alone this love can flow. It is then only when we ‘behold’ by faith ‘what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us’,

1 John 3:1.

in giving his only Son that we might not perish but have everlasting life,

John 3:16.

that ‘the love of God is shed abroad in our heart, by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us.’

Rom. 5:5.

It is only then, when we ‘rejoice in hope of the glory of God’,

Rom. 5:2.

that ‘we love him because he first loved us.’

1 John 4:19.

But what can cold reason do in this matter? It may present us with fair ideas: it can draw a fine picture of love; but this is only a painted fire!

Cf. OED for an instance of this metaphor in Middle English as early as 1300.

And farther than this reason cannot go. I made the trial for many years. I collected the finest hymns, prayers, and meditations which I could find in any language; and I said, sung, or read them over and over with all possible seriousness and attention; but still I was like the bones in Ezekiel’s vision: ‘The skin covered them above; but there was no breath in them.’

Ezek. 37:8.

99. And as reason cannot produce the love of God, so neither can it produce the love of our neighbour, a calm, generous, disinterested benevolence to every child of man. This earnest, steady goodwill to our fellow-creatures never flowed from any fountain but gratitude to our Creator. And if this be (as a very ingenious man supposes)

Probably Francis Hutcheson, professor of philosophy at Glasgow, whose stress on disinterested benevolence, transcending religious or utilitarian motives, struck Wesley as both wrong and dangerous. Cf. No. 12, ‘The Witness of Our Own Spirit’, §5 and n.

the very essence of virtue, it follows that virtue can have no being unless it spring from the love of God. Therefore as reason cannot produce this love, so neither can it produce virtue.

1010. And as it cannot give either faith, hope, love, or virtue, so it cannot give happiness, since separate from these there can be no happiness for any intelligent creature. It is true, those who are void of all virtue may have pleasures such as they are; but happiness they have not, cannot have. No:

02:599

Their joy is all sadness,

Their mirth is all vain:

Their laughter is madness:

Their pleasure is pain!

Charles Wesley, Hymns for Those That Seek Redemption (1747), p. 32 (Poet. Wks., IV.241).

Pleasures? Shadows! Dreams! Fleeting as the wind; unsubstantial as the rainbow! As unsatisfying to the poor, gasping soul,

“As the gay colours of an eastern cloud.

See James Thomson, The Seasons, ‘Spring’, I.203: ‘Meantime refracted from yon eastern cloud’.

”

None of these will stand the test of reflection: if thought comes, the bubble breaks.

Suffer me now to add a few, plain words; first to you who undervalue reason. Never more declaim in that wild, loose, ranting manner against this precious gift of God. Acknowledge ‘the candle of the Lord’,

Prov. 20:27. A slogan of the Cambridge Platonists; cf. Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms (1753), No. 916; and Nathaniel Culverwell, Discourse on the Light of Nature (1661; 2nd edn, 1669), I.1.

which he hath fixed in our souls for excellent purposes. You see how many admirable ends it answers, were it only in the things of this life; of what unspeakable use is even a moderate share of reason in all our worldly employments, from the lowest and meanest offices of life, through all the intermediate branches of business, till we ascend to those that are of the highest importance and the greatest difficulty. When therefore you despise or depreciate reason you must not imagine you are doing God service; least of all are you promoting the cause of God when you are endeavouring to exclude reason out of religion. Unless you wilfully shut your eyes, you cannot but see of what service it is both in laying the foundation of true religion, under the guidance of the Spirit of God, and in raising the whole superstructure. You see it directs us in every point both of faith and practice: it guides us with regard to every branch both of inward and outward holiness. Do we not glory in this, that the whole of our religion is a ‘reasonable service’.

Rom. 12:1.

Yea, and that every part of it, when it is duly performed, is the highest exercise of our understanding.

Permit me to add a few words to you likewise who overvalue 02:600reason. Why should you run from one extreme into the other? Is not the middle way best?

Cf. No. 27, ‘Sermon on the Mount, VII’, §4 and n.

Let reason do all that reason can: employ it as far as it will go. But at the same time acknowledge it is utterly incapable of giving either faith, or hope, or love; and consequently of producing either real virtue or substantial happiness. Expect these from a higher source, even from the Father of the spirits of all flesh.

See Num. 16:22; 27:16.

Seek and receive them not as your own acquisition, but as the gift of God. Lift up your hearts to him who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not.

Jas. 1:5.

He alone can give that faith which is the evidence and ‘conviction of things not seen’.

Cf. Heb. 11:1.

He alone can ‘beget you unto a lively hope’

Cf. 1 Pet. 1:3.

of an inheritance eternal in the heavens.

2 Cor. 5:1.

And he alone can ‘shed abroad his love in your heart by the Holy Ghost given unto you’.

Cf. Rom. 5:5.

Ask, therefore, and it shall be given you;

See Matt. 7:7.

cry unto him, and you shall not cry in vain. How can you doubt! ‘If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father who is in heaven give the Holy Ghost unto them that ask him!’

Cf. Luke 11:13.

So shall you be living witnesses that wisdom, holiness, and happiness are one,

Cf. No. 5, ‘Justification by Faith’, I.4 and n.

are inseparably united; and are indeed the beginning of that ‘eternal life which God hath given us in his Son’.

Cf. 1 John 5:11.

Langham Row, July 6, 1781

Place and date as in AM.

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Entry Title: Sermon 70: The Case of Reason Impartially Considered

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